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American constitutional scholarship can sometimes seem enormously 
repetitive.  Even if there are truly new ideas or truly new perspectives, they 
seem to be answering the same old questions.  We have popular 
constitutionalism, which seems to be both an old idea and an answer to the 
old questions posed by our “obsession” with the role of unelected judges in a 
democratic society.1  The paradigmatic scholarly event in the law in any 
given academic year is still probably the publication of the Supreme Court 
Foreword by the Harvard Law Review.2  The more things change, the more 
they stay the same. 
In this crowded scholarly world, Jamal Greene’s work in his short 
career so far stands out.  He has been writing about another overanalyzed 
topic in constitutional law, originalism, but has been offering some fresh new 
perspectives.  Professor Greene’s earlier work focused on the national 
politics surrounding originalism.3  More recently, along with several 
collaborators, he has written about the individual politics and public opinion 
data surrounding originalism.4  To these new perspectives on originalism we 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  My thanks go to 
Jamal Greene and the editors of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to write this Response, and 
to Brad Snyder and Peter Smith for their comments on this Response. 
1. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
2. See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and 
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463 (1994–1995) (“Since 1951 the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review have selected a prominent scholar of constitutional law to write a ‘Foreword’ 
to the Review’s annual survey of the work of the Supreme Court.”). 
3. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
4. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-
232), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1567702.  
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have the article I will respond to here, which begins the conversation about 
originalism from a comparative perspective.5  Professor Greene argues that 
originalism is distinctively an American obsession, and offers some initial 
explanations as to why that is the case. 
Richard Primus has helpfully responded to the article from a domestic 
constitutional theory perspective.6  I will address the article from a 
comparative constitutional law perspective.  From this perspective, I consider 
Professor Greene’s work very promising, but also as posing some concerns 
addressed very briefly in this Response.  First, the article needs to be clearer 
about whose attitudes towards originalism it is comparing: courts, 
commentators, or countries?  Are we discussing just the United States 
Supreme Court versus other high courts?  Are we discussing elite political 
and social actors in the United States compared to other countries?  Are we 
comparing academics in the United States and other countries?  As I will 
briefly mention, the differences in attitudes towards originalism might be 
more or less dramatic depending on whose attitudes we are comparing, and 
depending on whose attitudes we are comparing we might need different 
types of evidence than the types Professor Greene provides. 
Second, Professor Greene might be comparing the wrong countries.  
Professor Greene compares originalism in the United States to originalism in 
Canada and Australia, because of what he considers to be the relevant and 
important similarities between the constitutional systems of these three 
countries.7  In an ongoing project, though, I argue that the most relevant 
dimensions of a country that explains its orientation towards originalism is 
whether or not its constitution created the nation that lives under the 
constitution, or whether the constitution merely reorganized the institutions 
of the country but did not create the nation that lives under the constitution.  
In other words, was the constitution revolutionary, or reorganizational?  The 
American Constitution was perhaps the first nation-creating, revolutionary 
constitution, and so has always featured an element of originalism.  The other 
countries that Professor Greene examines—Canada and Australia—feature 
 
5. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2009) (considering 
why originalism is a major topic of discussion in the United States and less so at least in some other 
countries). 
6. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 79 
(2010) (examining some of the forms of ethical arguments that Professor Greene highlights in his 
Article).  
7. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 5, at 1 (“This Article . . . focus[es] particular attention on the 
political and constitutional histories of Canada and Australia, nations that, like the United States, 
have well-established traditions of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with 
the United States a common law adjudicative norm.”); id. at 4–5 (“Like the United States, Canada 
and Australia are stable, liberal, federal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established 
traditions of judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing relative to most of the 
world’s.  Moreover, all three countries have common law legal regimes derived from British 
practice and so seem more likely than civil law countries to approach constitutional interpretation 
using the evolutionary and judge-empowering methods generally disfavored by originalists.”). 
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“constitutions” (the foundational documents in both of these countries are 
usually called something other than simply “the Constitution” in the first 
place) that simply reorganized existing communities rather than created those 
communities.  For the purposes of comparing modalities of constitutional 
interpretation, then, Professor Greene is not really comparing  
“the most similar” countries, but instead the most polar opposite countries.8 
II. What Are We Comparing? 
In order to assess the accuracy of the comparisons highlighted in his 
article, it must first be clear what Professor Greene intends to compare.  
Professor Greene seems to compare the discussions regarding constitutional 
interpretation in entire countries9—that is, he wants to compare the decisions 
of courts, the writing of leading academics, and the discussions by leading 
social and political commentators.  But to compare systematic and 
comprehensive institutions, we need systematic and comprehensive evidence, 
and the article is largely lacking on that front (particularly outside of the 
United States).  I admire Professor Greene for the enormity of the 
comparison in constitutional interpretation that he purports to undertake.  
Comparative constitutional law, because of the importance of context and 
detail, might be a field like legal history in that scholarly projects are better 
suited as scholarly books rather than as law review articles.  But if these 
overall country comparisons are going to be done as law review articles, as 
Professor Greene tries to do, then the evidence presented must be systematic. 
Consider, for instance, a comparison of originalism in the United States 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the High Court of 
Australia.  I would argue that the interpretive differences between these 
courts in terms of how these courts actually use originalism to decide cases 
are overall much smaller than Professor Greene suggests.  Professor Greene 
states that our Supreme Court is more originalist than other courts.10  But is 
this really true?  There are certainly examples of major American Supreme 
Court opinions that talk about originalism, most recently and notably District 
of Columbia v. Heller.11  There are also examples of major Supreme Court 
opinions that do not make any substantial references to originalist evidence, 
like the University of Michigan affirmative action cases in 2003,12 cases 
about the Fourteenth Amendment that never seriously engage with the Civil 
 
8. Id. at 4 n.11 (stating that the Article tries to compare the “most similar cases”). 
9. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“[O]riginalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United States.”). 
10. See id. at 4. (observing that “few peoples more earnestly or enthusiastically engage 
originalist constitutional premises than we do”). 
11. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2796 (2008) (discussing, inter alia, the original draft of the Second 
Amendment).  See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246, 256–57 (2008) (noting that the majority and dissenting opinions rely much on 
originalist evidence). 
12.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
(neither making thorough originalist arguments in the majority opinions). 
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War or the leading creators of the Civil War Amendment like John Bingham.  
In Canada, originalism factors into constitutional decisions at least in part 
and at least some of the time,13 and Professor Greene himself notes that 
originalism has had at least some supporters on the High Court of Australia.14 
The record, then, is more mixed than the article suggests.  Some of the 
time the American Supreme Court relies on originalism, sometimes it does 
not.  Some of the time the Canadian Supreme Court and Australian High 
Court discuss originalist evidence, sometimes they do not.  Since this is not a 
comparison of courts that always use originalism with courts that never do, 
we need more systematic evidence, because Professor Greene does want to 
show that in general our Supreme Court is more originalist than other courts. 
Various forms of systematic evidence might suffice.  Perhaps evidence that 
in major constitutional cases the courts really differ; perhaps evidence about 
in what percent of cases the United States Supreme Court cites The 
Federalist Papers compared to similar references in the Canadian Supreme 
Court and the Australian High Court.  Regardless of what type of systematic 
evidence is used, some of it must be systematic.  To make general arguments 
we need general evidence.  Professor Greene’s conclusions are surely right 
and quite interesting, but the evidence used must match these claims. 
Professor Greene’s claims are probably more clearly true when it comes 
to the prominence of originalism in the scholarly, political, and social 
commentary of these countries.  While it is easy to find originalism in the 
scholarship of both politically conservative15 and politically liberal16 
American academics, it is hard to find any examples of academics elsewhere 
in the world discussing originalism as much as they do in the United States.  
While it is easy to find originalism discussed by political actors17 or social 
movements18 in the United States, it is hard to find originalism discussed by 
 
13. See Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 507–09 (Can.) 
(considering the minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and House of Commons as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of constitutional provisions).  
14. See Greene, supra note 5, at 40–62 (describing “faint-hearted” support for originalist 
arguments in Australian jurisprudence).  
15. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, 
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 676–77 (2006) (citing the Supreme Court’s originalist reasoning 
with approval).  
16. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 
295–303 (2007) (explaining the relevance and importance of constitutional interpretation based on 
originalist and original expected application arguments); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism 
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (2009) (proposing and praising the 
compatibility of originalism and living constitutionalism); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and 
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 442–54 (2007) (emphasizing value of both 
originalist interpretation and interpretation based on original expected application).  
17. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554 (2006) (“Since the 1980s, originalism has primarily 
served as an ideology that inspires political mobilization and engagement.  Its success and influence 
is due chiefly to its uncanny capacity to facilitate passionate political participation.”).  
18. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism?, THE LIMBAUGH 
LETTER, Dec. 2005, at 12, available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/ 
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either group outside of the United States.  But again, systematic evidence 
would suffice.  Are there really any articles in the leading law reviews of 
Canada and Australia about originalism?  Are there speeches on the floor of 
their respective legislatures?  Do their religious leaders not discuss 
originalism, as our religious leaders sometimes do?  Again, all important 
questions that must be considered if systematic arguments are to be made, 
and none of these questions are really addressed in the article. 
III. Selecting the Right Case Studies 
My more substantial concern with Professor Greene’s rather important 
article has to do with what countries he compares and why he compares these 
particular countries, rather than what segments of each country he decides to 
compare.  Professor Greene focuses on three countries, but uses these 
particular case studies to make some fairly general conclusions.19  To reach 
the conclusions he wants to reach, though, Professor Greene selects precisely 
the wrong countries to compare to the United States, rather than the right 
countries. 
Large-N studies—or studies of a range of countries rather than a 
particularly important few—have become the trend in a wide range of 
academic disciplines focused on comparison, as noted by the leading tracts 
on comparative social science methodology.20  It is hard to do large-N studies 
in comparative constitutional law, though, because there simply are not that 
many countries that have stable, politically relevant constitutions and 
constitutional courts.21  Moreover, because of linguistic and other 
 
limfunoriginalism.guest.html (“Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your political 
and social beliefs.  It means not citing foreign law to support your preferences.  It means not 
imposing your personal policy whims on society via judicial fiat.  And where the Constitution is 
silent, it means not inventing a penumbra to support your own opinion.”). 
19. See Greene, supra note 5, at 3 (“The notion that the meaning of a political constitution is, in 
any practical sense, fixed at some point in the past and authoritative in present cases is pooh-poohed 
by most leading jurists in Canada, South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of Europe.”); id. 
(considering “[t]he global rejection of American-style originalism”); id. at 5–6 (“In short, although 
some version of originalist judicial practice is not peculiar to the United States, the historicist 
appeals that support American originalism have a potency here that is found in few foreign 
constitutional courts,  not the least the two most like our own.”); id. at 18 (“Outside the United 
States, American originalism is as well-known as it is marginalized.”); id. at 62 (“Yet hardly any 
sober or respectable foreign nation, our closest cousins included, boasts a similar mass of opinion in 
favor of American-style originalism.  Even in other democratic nations with long traditions of 
constitutional judicial review, with deep common law roots, and with difficult processes of 
constitutional amendment, resistance to judicial activism does not commingle with historical 
fetishism.”).  
20. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 67 (1994); RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED 
STANDARDS xvii (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004).  
21. Tom Ginsburg and Zachary Elkins have produced a helpful database that provides more 
general comparative constitutional law information, and have produced some large-N comparative 
constitutional studies using this database.  See generally ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & 
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009). 
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considerations, we do not have all of the relevant information about those 
countries in the first place. 
That means that comparative constitutional law has tended to focus on 
the same smaller number of countries: Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, South Africa, France, Germany, and India.  There are 
exceptions,22 but the leading law review articles on comparative 
constitutional law to this point focus primarily on these countries.23 
Professor Greene is using a small-N approach, and looks to two of these 
commonly examined countries, in his case Canada and Australia.  Professor 
Greene states very clearly that he is using a “most similar cases” approach to 
comparative constitutional scholarship.  By this, he means that he is 
comparing the following: 
[C]ases that have similar characteristics, or cases that are matched on 
all variables or potential explanations that are not central to the study, 
but vary in the values on the key independent and dependent variables.  
By controlling for variables or potential explanations that are not 
central to the study, the most similar cases principle helps “isolate” the 
great significance of the variance on the key independent variable in 
determining the variance on the dependent variable, thereby allowing 
for partial substitute for statistical or experimental control.  What is 
more, because the most similar cases principle suggests that 
comparable cases should be selected so as to hold constant non-key 
variables while isolating the explanatory power of the key independent 
variable, this approach is the most adequate for a diachronic, cross-
time comparison within the same polity (e.g. a study of the impact of a 
certain change through a pre change/post change comparison).24 
The countries that Professor Greene considers to be “the most similar 
cases” are the United States, Canada and Australia.25  He selects Canada and 
Australia to compare to the United States because they are “two foreign legal 
regimes that are in many key respects comparable to our own.”26 
 But comparable in what ways?  Before comparing similar cases, we 
need a convincing argument as to why these countries “are matched on all 
variables or potential explanations that are not central to the study, but vary 
 
22. E.g., GRETCHEN L. HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS AND 
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (2005); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2005); JEFFREY K. STATON, 
JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO (2010); MARY L. VOLCANSEK, 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2000).  
23. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1041, 1055–
56, 1061–62 (2004) (discussing primarily Canada and South Africa); Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form 
Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2006) (relying 
primarily on Canada and the United Kingdom).  
24. Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 125, 135 (2005). 
25. Greene, supra note 5, at 4 n.11.  
26. Id. at 4. 
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in the values on the key independent and dependent variables.”27  In 
Professor Greene’s article, though, we have a footnote saying that he is using 
the “most similar cases” approach.28  In other places, as far as I can tell, there 
are two other explicit statements about how these three countries are the 
“most similar cases”: first, a statement that “This Article . . . . focus[es] 
particular attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada and 
Australia, nations that, like the United States, have well-established traditions 
of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the 
United States a common law adjudicative norm”29 and then a statement that  
Like the United States, Canada and Australia are stable, liberal, 
federal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established 
traditions of judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing 
relative to most of the world’s.  Moreover, all three countries have 
common law legal regimes derived from British practice and so seem 
more likely than civil law countries to approach constitutional 
interpretation using the evolutionary and judge-empowering methods 
generally disfavored by originalists.30 
 It is not clear whether these factors mean that Canada and Australia 
are the most similar cases, and whether these factors are relevant here.  First, 
Canada and Australia do not have the most similar histories of “judicial 
enforcement of a written constitution”31 as Professor Greene suggests.  
Canada has only clearly judicially enforced a written constitution since the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,32 meaning in fact it has one of the 
least similar and shortest histories of judicial enforcement of a written 
constitution.  Australia still does not have a written constitution similar to the 
American Constitution.  It does have a constitution dating back some time, 
and so Australian judicial review does operate like American judicial review 
because Australian courts do have “‘general authority to determine what the 
Constitution means’”33 and their “constitutional interpretations are 
authoritative and binding.”34  Even putting aside that this broad power of 
judicial review power in Australia is more recent and more controversial 
there than here, Australia does not include an explicit bill of rights,35 which 
 
27. Hirschl, supra note 23, at 134. 
28. Greene, supra note5, at 4 n.11. 
29. Id. at 1. 
30. Id. at 4–5. 
31. Id. at 1. 
32. See Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 507 (Can.) (describing 
the history of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
33. See Kathleen E. Foley, Australian Judicial Review, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 281, 
281 (2007) (quoting Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 
2784 (2003)). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 285. 
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makes the Australian system an “outlier in modern constitutional systems,”36 
particularly when compared to the American system. 
 Second, it is certainly true that Canada and Australia have a “common 
law adjudicative norm”37 similar to the United States.  But the “common 
law” adjective more usually describes how torts or contracts works in a 
country than it does how that country’s constitutional adjudication system 
operates.  The common law countries inspired by the British common law 
tradition have, in fact, been the real outliers when it comes to constitutional 
law, as they have been the last few to adopt written constitutions enforceable 
by courts.  Even then, they have only adopted something like what Stephen 
Gardbaum has called the “Commonwealth model” of judicial review rather 
than the “American model.”38  At the same time, civil law countries like 
Germany have aggressive constitutional courts with broad interpretive 
mandates,39 similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in the common law United 
States. 
 In my preliminary studies of comparative originalism, as part of a 
larger ongoing project, I have instead found that the “most similar cases” to 
the United States when it comes to constitutional interpretation are those 
countries where the constitution emerges from a revolution that creates the 
nation, rather than a constitutional process that simply reorganized the 
country and did not create the nation.  I call this distinction, or really this 
continuum, the difference between “revolutionary” constitutions and 
“reorganizational” constitutions.  Where a constitution is revolutionary, the 
countries tend to be more focused on the founding moment and so tend to 
focus more on what might be called an interpretive originalism.  This is 
because the founding moment and the role of the constitution in that moment 
creates a series of national and cultural ideas and individuals that will be 
relevant in the years to come. 
 For instance, the founders of the Constitution in a revolutionary 
constitution are not just the founders of the Constitution, but also the 
founders of the cultural nation.  James Madison and George Washington 
were instrumental in the creation of the American Constitution.  But Madison 
and Washington were also instrumental in the creation of the American 
nation.  So, we refer to those constitutional founders, and their constitutional 
ideas have resonance in the years to come, because they were also the 
 
36. Id. 
37. Greene, supra note 5, at 1. 
38. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 707, 707–08 (2001) (noting that the Commonwealth model of judicial review differs from 
the American model because it does not grant fundamental rights higher legal status than 
legislation, is not entrenched against ordinary repeal, and is not always enforced by courts setting 
aside legislation). 
39. See, e.g., Donald Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political 
System, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 470, 470 (describing the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany as 
the “most active and powerful constitutional court in Europe”).  
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founders for the entire nation.  Their presence becomes a powerful 
legitimating tool because they were “present at the creation”40 of the nation 
as well as of the Constitution.  The Constitution is simultaneous with the 
creation moment, and the drafters of the Constitution tend to be taken from 
the group of individuals who are also the creators of the nation.  This means 
the constitutional founders take on a certain status beyond just the words they 
wrote into the Constitution.  They become quasi-religious figures, bringing a 
nation from isolation into a separate, juridical, autonomous existence.  
Revolutionary constitutions, then, promote originalism because of the 
particular reverence associated with the individual figures associated with the 
creation of the Constitution—because they are also the individual figures 
associated with the creation of the nation. 
 Likewise, the founders and the founding generation become 
consequential because they are the first individuals and the first generation 
with a series of ideas about constitutions and government and everything else 
that are seen as legitimate.  They are the first intellectuals, the first creators, 
of the new cultural nation.  Ideas from before the founding generation are 
seen as either illegitimate, or less legitimate, because they were the ideas that 
the nation broke from in order to create the constitution and the nation that 
was in part created by the constitution.  Not just Madison as an individual but 
Madison’s generation has a certain resonance because that generation is the 
first generation of Americans and so is the first generation with legitimated 
ideas about the world. 
 If the nation predated the constitution, then several key cultural and 
political understandings (what Paul Kahn has called the “interpretive 
community” that defines a particular constitutional tradition)41 would predate 
the constitution and significantly affect how the constitution was interpreted.  
But if the constitution is created as the nation is created (and as part of the 
creation of that nation), then the first series of legitimate ideas about the 
social and political order are the ideas (and the individuals) that were also 
behind the creation of the Constitution.  In other words, just as the 
individuals creating a constitution in revolutionary constitutions take on a 
certain role, so do the ideas behind the constitution of that generation.  They 
are individuals and ideas that were the first to found the nation, not just the 
constitution. 
 Given these realities, it should not be surprising that countries whose 
courts and commentators make originalist arguments tend to come from 
revolutionary constitutional traditions or are acting in revolutionary 
constitutional moments; the post-colonial constitutions of African and Latin 
 
40. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
(1969). 
41. See Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1993) (discussing the “unique, historically identifiable qualities of 
the . . . community” behind a constitution). 
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America, for instance, foster many originalist arguments.42  Countries whose 
courts and commentators do not make originalist arguments tend to have 
constitutions that postdated the creation of the nation.  This is not to say that 
countries with revolutionary constitutions always focus on originalist 
evidence and countries with reorganizational constitutions never do.  Rather, 
it is simply to say that the more revolutionary the constitutional tradition or 
the moment, ceteris paribus, the greater the tendency there is to have 
discussions of originalism.   
 Given these general arguments about the distinction between the 
revolutionary versus reorganizational creation of constitutions, and how it 
matters for later constitutional interpretation, Professor Greene’s case studies 
appear to be completely opposite case studies rather than “the most similar 
cases.”  The American Constitution was revolutionary, not just because of 
the speed with which it was created, as Professor Greene briefly 
acknowledges,43 but because before the American Constitution there was no 
United States of America.  Books about the founding fathers sell well among 
the general public not because Madison was simply the creator of the 
Constitution, but because Madison and his generation were the creators of 
the nation and the constitution.  Their individual roles and fame, and the 
prominence of their ideas, are because they were the first Americans.  By 
contrast, Pierre Trudeau, who was instrumental in the creation of 
constitutional judicial review in Canada via the 1982 Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, was not the creator of the Canadian nation.  Canada—and 
Australia—“had functional constitutions by the start of the twentieth century 
. . . and both countries were to varying degrees formally bound by the British 
Crown well into the 1980s.”44  The constitution postdated some basic cultural 
and political understandings in Canada and Australia, and so did the creators 
of the Canadian Charter and the Australian Constitution.  This is not just true 
 
42. One interesting recent example of the invocation of originalist arguments from a court 
interpreting a post-colonial constitution comes from a recent landmark decision by the Dehli High 
Court in India striking down a law criminalizing adult consensual sodomy.  See Naz Foundation v. 
Government of the NCT, W.P. (C) No.7455/2001 of 2009 (Delhi HC); (2009) 160 DLT 277.  The 
Constitution of India, adopted in 1950 after India’s independence, functioned as the “cornerstone of 
a nation.”  GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1999).  
In general, though, particularly compared to other post-colonial systems, “originalism [is] rarely 
invoked by Indian courts.”  Vikram Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy and Nebulous in Naz 
Foundation, 2 N.U.J.S. L. REV. 297, 298 (2009).  In deciding Naz—a particularly nation-defining 
case—the Dehli High Court referred back to the ideas behind the creation of the Constitution of 
India, discussing “where the notion of equality in the Indian Constitution flows from,” Naz 
Foundation, supra, ¶ 129, as coming from the creation moment of the Constitution (and the creation 
moment of the nation, since the court cites to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru).  See Naz Foundation, 
supra, ¶ 129.  See also Sonia K. Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1464-67 
(2000) (discussing the “Indian originalism” that the decision embodied). 
43. See Greene, supra note 5, at 6 (“[O]ur Constitution is perceived as revolutionary rather than 
evolutionary.  The United States announced its sovereignty quickly, painfully, and without 
sympathy to its former colonizers . . . .  The sovereign ‘moments’ of Canada and Australia were 
glacial by comparison.”). 
44. Id. 
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of Canada and Australia, but also of many of the other commonly studied 
constitutions examined in current comparative constitutional law scholarship 
(places like France and the United Kingdom, for instance).  Perhaps this is 
why much of the salience of originalism around the world has been missed to 
this point. 
IV. Conclusion 
 How many law review articles in the United States each year ask a 
genuine new question, and provide genuinely new answers?  Surely just a 
handful, and Professor Greene’s article ranks among that handful.  One could 
search many American law reviews over hundreds of years, and many 
foreign publications, and not find anyone asking the question “why is the 
United States so interested in originalism”?  Simply posing this question and 
providing a theory as to its answer represents an enormous step forward in 
our discussion about American constitutional interpretation. 
 My concern is, then, not with the fascinating question that Professor 
Greene poses, nor with the interesting answer he provides but more with the 
way he provides that answer.  Being the first scholar to pose a question—let 
alone the first to provide a substantial answer—is a dangerous task, because 
going first means you are bound to slightly neglect some arguments that 
might only be raised if many people were posing and answering the question.  
Without the benefit of the scholarly echo chambers, things are much more 
difficult.  The gaps in Professor Greene’s article do not make me question 
many of his analyses or explanations, but they mean that as discussion of this 
topic proceeds further, there is still much to be written.  And for that, we owe 
Professor Greene a huge debt. 
